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WHY EUROPE REJECTED AMERICAN 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND WHY IT MAY NOT MATTER 
Alec Stone Sweet* 
In 1803, when Marbury v. Madison1 was rendered, the French were 
busy completing the destruction of independent judicial authority. 
That process began in 1789, the year the U.S. Constitution entered 
into force. The French law of August 16-24, 1790, which remains in 
application today, prohibited judicial review of legislative and 
administrative acts, as did the country's first written constitution, 
completed in 1791.2 By 1804, a new legal system had emerged. It was 
constructed on the principle - a corollary of legislative sovereignty -
that courts must not participate in the lawmaking function. The judge 
was instead imagined as a virtual "slave of the legislature" or, more 
precisely, a slave of the code system of law.3 The codes are statutes 
that, in their idealized form, purport to regulate society both 
permanently and comprehensively, thereby reducing judicial 
discretion to nil. Through mimesis and war, the code system and the 
prohibition of judicial review spread across Europe. Although the 
nineteenth century saw near continuous regime change, and old states 
disappeared or were absorbed into new ones, a relatively stable 
constitutional orthodoxy nonetheless prevailed. In this orthodoxy, 
constitutions could be revised at the discretion of the lawmaker; 
separation of powers doctrines subjugated judicial to legislative 
authority; and constraints on the lawmaker's authority, such as rights, 
either did not exist or could not be enforced by courts. 
In 1903, the leading Public Law scholars in France were busy 
mounting what would become a noisy campaign to import judicial 
review. The movement would span three republics and as many 
* Official Fellow, Chair of Comparative Government, Nuffield College, Oxford. Senior 
Fellow, Schell Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). · 
2. "Courts cannot interfere with the exercise of legislative powers, suspend the 
application of the laws, nor can they infringe on administrative functions, or take cognizance 
of administrative acts of any kind." CONST. tit. III, ch. V, art. 3 (1791). Translations of 
French materials are my own. 3. As Marshall was writing Marbury, French lawmakers 
were putting the final touches on the Napoleonic Code. For an introduction and overview of 
the civil law system, see JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1985). 
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generations of scholars. In the end, it failed. The major political 
parties, invoking the specter of an American-style "Government of 
Judges," consistently blocked proposals to authorize judicial review. 
They did so in the name of democracy, that is, to secure the General 
Will: the sovereignty of the People as expressed through Parliament. 4 
In 2003, after a polite nod to Westminster, parliamentary 
sovereignty can be pronounced dead. It was killed off during the 
second half of the twentieth century in successive waves of 
constitution-making that followed a world war, the overthrow of 
military dictatorship in Southern Europe, and the collapse of 
Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. All European 
constitutions written after World War II establish enforceable, 
substantive constraints on government, including constraints on 
legislative and executive authority, in the form of human rights, the 
scope and content of which go far beyond the American Bill of Rights. 
With very few exceptions, all such constitutions provide for 
"constitutional review" by a "constitutional court." Unlike an 
American-style supreme court, the European constitutional court is a 
specialized jurisdiction, detached from the judiciary. Its purpose is to 
ensure the normative superiority of the constitutional law. Such bodies 
have been established in Austria (reestablished in 1945), Italy (1948), 
Germany (1949), France (1958), Portugal (1976), Spain (1978), and 
Belgium (1985). After 1989, the institution spread to the 
post-Communist democracies of the Baltics, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and in still 
other states of the former USSR and Yugoslavia.5 
In this Article, I explore the question of why constitutional review, 
but not American judicial review, spread across Europe. 6  I will also 
4. As discussed below, Jean Jacques Rousseau's theory of the General Will (la Volonte 
Generale) has been a core component of post-1789 French democratic and constitutional 
theory. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Judith R. Masters 
trans., Roger D. Masters ed., St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762). Article 1 of the 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man states: "Statute [la Joi] is the expression of the General 
Will." 
5 .  For Western Europe, see ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW (1989), and ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES (2000). 
For Central and Eastern Europe, see HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2000), and CONSTITUTIONAL 
JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 
2002). The activities of Central and East European constitutional courts are regularly 
surveyed in the East European Constitutional Review, published by the New York University 
Law School. In the inter-war years, Austria, Germany, Spain, and some of the states of 
Central Europe had possessed some type of constitutional court, of varying effectiveness. 
6. For the purposes of this paper, "constitutional review" refers to the authority of any 
governmental institution to declare statutes (and all other acts of government) 
unconstitutional. "Judicial review" comprises but one mode of constitutional review: that 
which is exercised by the judiciary in the course of processing litigation. 
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argue that, despite obvious organic differences between the American 
and European systems of review, there is an increasing convergence in 
how review actually operates. I proceed as follows. In Part I, I 
examine the debate on establishing judicial review in Europe, focusing 
on the French. In Parts II and III, I contrast the European and the 
American models of review, and briefly discuss why the Kelsenian 
constitutional court diffused across Europe. In Part IV, I argue that 
despite important formal, institutional distinctions, there is increasing 
convergence in how the two systems of review actually operate. 
I. PROHIBITION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
One enduring legacy of the French Revolution is the prohibition of 
judicial review.7 The purpose of the prohibition is to seal off the 
"political function" (lawmaking) from the "judicial function" (dispute 
resolution), thereby securing the supremacy of statute within the legal 
order. 
From the first moments of the R�volution, the Rousseauian 
identification of legislation with the General Will and legislators with 
popular sovereignty was constitutionally enshrined,8 producing a 
separation of powers doctrine that rigidly circumscribed judicial 
authority. During this period, parliamentarians thought the judiciary a 
corrupt and reactionary enemy of social reform and decried the 
"confusion of powers" entailed by judicial review (i.e., judicial and 
lawmaking functions are alleged to be indistinguishable). Not 
surprisingly, the Parlements, judicial institutions that exercised a form 
of review over royal acts under the Ancien Regime, were an early 
casualty; for all practical purposes, they were abolished by the 
Assembly in a decree of 1789.9 Following Rousseau, statutes were to 
be the only legitimate source of law, and the codes were to be written 
in the most simple and nontechnical language possible. In this way, 
politics would be made transparent, the legitimacy of the new social 
compact assured, and the multitude of intermediate institutions and 
social practices separating the People from the State, and obscuring 
that fundamental relationship, could be cleared away. The legislature 
7. In France, the prohibition was formalized as a punishable offense in the penal code. 
Article 127 of the code states that "judges shall be guilty of an abuse of their authority and 
punished with loss of their civil rights" for interfering with the legislature or administration 
"by issuing regulations containing legislative provisions, by suspending application of one or 
several laws, or by deliberating on whether or not a law will be published or applied." Dating 
from the Napoleonic era, the provision has never been abrogated. 
8. Article 6 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man states: "Legislation is the 
expression of the general will [la volonte genera le] ." 
9. See A. ESMEIN, COURS ELEMENTAIRE D'HISTOIRE DU DROIT FRANCAIS 518-40 
(1903); M. PETIET, DU POUVOIR LEGISLATIF EN FRANCE 222 (1891); J.H. SHENNAN, THE 
PARLEMENT OF PARIS (1968). 
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considered legal science to be one of the more mystifying of these 
institutions, and it was hoped and expected that lawyers, and their 
penchant for doctrinal commentaries and formalist discourse, would 
gradually obsolesce and disappear. 1 0  Judges could then proceed in a 
straightforward manner, as civil servants applying the codes.11 
To make a convoluted story too simple, the new separation of 
powers doctrines favored the development of specialized jurisdictions 
detached from the judiciary. France's two supreme courts began just 
this way. The Constitution of 1795 established the Tribunal de 
cassation to protect lawmakers from judicial usurpation, conferring on 
it the power to void judgments "that contain any manifest 
contradiction with statutes." Although originally part of the 
legislature, Cassation gradually evolved into a supreme appellate 
jurisdiction and was later explicitly attached to the judiciary. Civil 
judges were also enjoined from reviewing the legality of administrative 
acts, although a system of review gradually developed within the 
administration itself, without express constitutional authorization. 
Today, the administrative courts operate as an autonomous "judicial" 
system under the supervision of a specialized section of the Conseil 
d'etat. 
Constitutional review mechanisms were periodically proposed, and 
some were in fact established. In 1793, the Abbe Sieyes failed to force 
a vote in the Chambre des deputees on his scheme to create a Grand 
jury ("to protect citizens against the oppression of the legislative body 
and the executive")12; but he later succeeded in vesting abstract review 
powers in what became the Senate of Napoleon's First Empire. 
Bonaparte's Senate never annulled a legislative or executive act, but 
the Emperor did use it to overturn judicial decisions he did not like, as 
10, DONALD R. KELLEY, HISTORIANS AND THE LAW IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY 
FRANCE 44 (1984). 
1 1 .  Although reformers recognized that problems of application might arise for judges, 
they worked to assure that only legislators could provide stable solutions. In 1799, one such 
parliamentarian put it this way: 
Only the legislature has the authority to interpret the law . . . .  Without this principle, judges 
would embark on a vast, unobstructed course of interpreting statutes according to their 
imaginations . . .  and even their passions. Judicial institutions would thus be entirely 
deformed. Judges would be able to substitute their will for that of the statute . . .  and 
establish themselves as legislators. 
Quoted in J. BOURDON, LA REFORME JUDICIARE DE L'AN VIII 432-33 (1942). 
12. The proposal was rejected after a vote on the following motion to dismiss: 
considering that a court of this type already exists - it's called public opinion - and that a 
new such court would be disastrous for the freedom of opinion of the legislative body . . .  
and considering that the People are always here, that they examine the conduct of their 
representatives and possess the power to punish them for their abuses; I insist that this 
amendment be rejected. 
Debats, Archives parlementaires, June 16, 1793, at 576-77. 
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well as "to fill gaps in the constitution."13 Although the Senate 
disappeared in 1815, it was revived by Napoleon III for the Second 
Empire, if to no noticeable effect. The Fourth Republic (1946-58) had 
its Constitutional Committee, a bizarre body composed of 
parliamentarians who never actually reviewed a legislative act. 1 4 
Finally, for the Fifth Republic (1958-), General De Gaulle and his 
agents established a quasi-Bonapartist institution,15 the Constitutional 
Council, as a means of ensuring executive control over the legislature. 
The Council now operates on a radically different basis, mainly to 
review the constitutionality of legislation that has been proposed by 
the executive and adopted by parliament, before it has entered into 
force. As discussed at length in Part III, pre-enforcement 
constitutional review - which Europeans call abstract review - is 
today found across the Continent. In France, the various constitutional 
review mechanisms established after 1789 have always been of an 
abstract nature. The logic, again, flows from separation of powers 
(legislative sovereignty): once a statute has entered into force, its legal 
validity may not be challenged. 
From the perspective of French separation of powers orthodoxies, 
the judicial function can only be a negligible one. As Merryman writes: 
"Legislative positivism, the dogma of the separation of powers, the 
ideology of codification, the attitude toward interpretation of 
statutes . . .  all these tend to diminish the judge and to glorify the 
Iegislator."1 6 But appearances can deceive. In the rest of this section, I 
describe and evaluate what I will show to be a "relatively" - and 
meaningfully - "autonomous" French legal tradition. The French use 
the term le Droit to describe the complex relationship between legal 
institutions, jurisprudence, and legal scholarship, with an emphasis on 
the latter. The community of legal scholars is also called la Doctrine. I 
will use both these terms. By relative autonomy, I mean the extent to 
which le Droit, and especially the legal discourse propagated by la 
Doctrine, does not conform to the classical model described above, 
13. IRENE COLLINS, NAPOLEON AND HIS PARLIAMENTS 63 (1979). 
14. The establishment of the Constitutional Committee is discussed in ALEC STONE, 
THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 27-29 (1992). 
15. General de Gaulle had little patience for legal niceties, once stating: 
Three things count in constitutional matters. First, the higher interest of the country ... and 
of that I alone am judge. Second, far behind, are the political circumstances, arrangements, 
tactics .... Third, much further behind, there is legalism . . .. I have accomplished nothing in 
my life except by putting the welfare of the country first and by refusing to be entrapped by 
legalisms. 
James Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 212-13. Later de 
Gaulle asked of a biographer, "Do you really believe I am bound by the constitution?" Id. 
16. MERRYMAN, supra note 3, at 56. 
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evolving, instead, its own internally derived set of moral and 
professional standards of conduct.17 
A wide range of judicial activities may provide evidence of 
autonomy, each likely flowing from one common source: the deeply 
held philosophical attachment to the notion of the law as a holistic 
system, with its own internal means of determining purpose and 
meaning. Simplifying, because the aim of le Droit is to perfect this 
system, it is thought both natural and necessary to insulate the law 
from the vagaries of the social world. There is, accordingly, a deep 
animosity to the incursion of le Politique - partisan passions, 
goings-on in parliament, and the like - because "things political" 
threaten to undermine this effort at perfection. 
The widespread devotion to the law-politics distinction explains to 
a large extent why the public law - constitutional and administrative 
law - has always suffered a relative lack of prestige within the ranks 
of the French legal community. Because private, especially economic, 
relations were traditionally considered to be outside the interference 
of government, the civil (or "private") law became the center of 
gravity for legal philosophy and science. Indeed, as Kelley notes, the 
civil code served almost "a constitutional function" for le Droit, being 
"the area of law in which the sole function of government was the 
recognition and enforcement of private rights."18 In the nineteenth 
century, judges and publicists consciously exploited the relationship 
between judicial authority and the defense of fundamental, that is, 
"natural," rights and were largely successful in reestablishing judicial 
primacy over interpretation.19 In contrast, the public lawyer's universe 
is a provisional one, continually being scrambled by first one 
manifestation of political power, before being recast by another. For 
the whole of the nineteenth century, a stable set of public liberties can 
be located only with great difficulty and are seemingly impossible to 
defend juridically. 
The most dramatic evidence of the relative autonomy of public law 
is to be found in doctrinal materials, not in the judgments of courts. In 
France, the ideology of codification did not succeed in eliminating 
legal discourse, although that was one of the ambitions of the code 
system.20 On the contrary, the legal scholar reemerged as the principal 
17. The question of how to define and then operationalize concepts associated with the 
"relative autonomy" of legal institutions, legal discourse, or "legal consciousness" is a 
complex one that I do not consider fully here. See STONE, supra note 14, at 10-15, ch. 1; 
Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Rogers Smith, Political 
Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism," and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 89 (1988). 
18. MERRYMAN, supra note 3, at 92-93. 
19. KELLEY, supra note 10, at 56-71 ,  134. 
20. "Bonaparte, watching the rising tide of jurisprudence, is said to have cried: 'My code 
is lost.' " KELLEY, supra note 10, at 44. 
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protagonist in the ongoing project to perfect the legal system, 
facilitated by the community's insularity. Indeed, an extraordinary 
renaissance of public law occurred during the second decade of the 
Third Republic, and the discipline subsequently entered a golden age. 
I can only offer some tentative explanations for the causes of this 
Renaissance. First, although the prior century was an unstable one -
no constitution had lasted more than fourteen years - by at least the 
1890s a remarkable consensus had developed on the utility of the 
constitutional laws of 1875 (perhaps because they were so flexible). By , 
the early twentieth century, the Third Republic and its constitutional 
life had come to be seen as a natural state of affairs. Second, a series of 
laws which sought to guarantee what in France are called "public 
liberties" were passed - on free association, union membership, ' 
freedom of the press, and so on - and these came to be seen as part · 
of a judicially applicable bill of rights. Third, and partly in 
consequence of the above, the Conseil d'etat was gradually assuming a 
judicial identity of its own.21 Fourth, new social movements, 
particularly on the left, were perceived by legal scholars as significant 
threats. Many of these scholars worked to show that a fundamental 
purpose of le Droit was to develop, as a means of achieving social 
order, what was alleged to be the law's inherent function of social 
integration.22 
In any event, during this period public law began to be taught as a 
separate branch of the law, and la Doctrine began to evolve 
independently. Specialized journals appeared, treatises multiplied and 
lengthened, and scholars, drifting away from projects oriented 
primarily to order the chaos of constitutional history, became 
consumed with the study of case law, especially the Conseil d'etat's. 
Statutes ceased to be recognized as dominant sources of law, freeing 
doctrinal commentary to lobby courts, not least to convince judges to 
rebel against strict separation of powers. In sum, this revival 
constituted a self-conscious movement to increase the prestige of 
Public Law and the social power of public lawyers. In 1894, the 
founder and first editor of the Revue du droit public, lamenting the 
21. In 1872, the Conseil d'etat was expressly recognized as a court, and it asserted for 
itself independence from the direct control of the ministries in 1889. It was thus able to 
shake off some of the taint of its imperial origins, and to provide a stable source of doctrinal 
commentary. 
22. Henry Nezard argued that "it is certain that, provoked by the frequency of abusive 
and arbitrary laws made in evident violation of every judicial sense, a powerful doctrinal 
movement developed to bestow upon the courts the power to refuse to apply laws contrary 
to the Constitution." A. ESMEIN, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 133 (1921). It is unlikely that 
Third Republic legislation was more abusive than what had occurred in the past - by any 
standard. On the contrary, it is much more likely that the movement developed when it did 
because for the first time there was a greater chance that policymakers could be influenced 
by la Doctrine. 
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fact that all too often politicians and journalists ignore la Doctrine, 
explained the Revue's "program" in the journal's inaugural issue: 
We hope that the idea of public law, that the forms of public law, that the 
procedures of public law will penetrate more deeply, each and every day, 
into constitutional, administrative, and international matters. Then and 
only then can any institution acquire the force of resistance that will 
permit it to brave the storms which will confront it.23 
This formative period in the history and sociology of modem 
French public law24 yielded a coherent argument for judicial 
autonomy, founded on the rejection of the ideology of the General 
Will: legislative sovereignty and its attendant prohibition against 
judicial review. This argument can be broken down into three main 
elements: (a) the belief, traceable to legal theorists of the Ancien 
Regime, that the constitution enjoys a special status as "higher law" in 
any hierarchy of legal norms, and that the judicial protection of that 
hierarchy is essential to the achievement of both political legitimacy 
and social order; (b) the belief that American-style judicial review is 
the only acceptable form of constitutional review, and that judges are 
morally and professionally required to begin exercising its review 
authority immediately; and (c) the effort to show that the evolution 
toward judicial review is not only natural and inevitable, but that 
judges had already begun doing it. Each of these elements will be 
examined in tum. 
A. La Doctrine, Normative Hierarchies, and the "Necessity" of 
Judicial Review 
The inclination to construct and then secure normative hierarchies 
is a central focus of European constitutional theory. The logical result 
of the statutory sovereignty is to make such efforts relatively simple: 
statute takes precedent over ministerial decree, decree takes 
precedent over a local regulation, and so on. But this was not always 
the case. The pre-Revolutionary notion of limitations to absolute 
monarchical sovereignty, flowing from the scholarly development of 
the natural law, is an example. What is remarkable about modem (i.e., 
post-1890) legal discourse is the extent to which publicists embraced 
neo-natural law ideals, seizing upon the rejection of the official 
hierarchy as inimical to le Droit itself. As Leon Duguit, arguably 
France's most influential public law scholar through the early decades 
of the twentieth century, wrote in 1917: 
[T]he persistent effort of French judicial doctrine has ever been, from 
1789 to the present time, to find the true juristic basis for the legal 
23. Ferdinand Larnaude, Notre programme, 1 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 3-4 (1894). 
24. I am aware of no scholarly treatment of either. 
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limitation upon the power of the State, and to insure its sanction. Its 
conceptions have been diverse . . . .  But the end in view has always been 
the same; namely, to prove that the powers of the State are limited by a 
jural principle (une regle de droit) superior to the State itself. 
Does there exist a jural principle (une regle de droit) superior to the 
State, which forbids it from doing certain things and commands it to do 
certain others? . . .  If the answer is no, then there is no public law, since 
no act or refusal to act on the part of the State will be contrary to law. 25  
And elsewhere: 
[W]e believe firmly that there is a rule of law above the individual and 
the State, above the rulers and the ruled; a rule which is compulsory on 
one and on the other; and we hold that if there is such a thing as 
sovereignty of the State, it is juridically limited by this rule of law . . . .  
[T]o express this in words . . .  is that of legal art. If this is too much for 
legal science and legal art, their study is not worth a moment's effort. 26  
Scholars worked to reconstruct the foundations of their field by 
positing the existence of an overarching higher law, to be elaborated 
and refined by le Droit, that is through scholarly activity. They grafted 
their project onto deep roots in the French legal tradition. Certain 
physiocratic legal scholars, like Dupont, Le Trosne, Le Vauguyon, and 
Le Mercier, had refined theories of judicial authority based on just 
such notions before being overwhelmed by the events of the 
Revolution.27 In these theories, "the laws of absolute and essential 
justice" were considered to be God's law, presocial and unwritten, 
which judges alone had the capacity to discover, interpret, and apply. 
In the domain of positive law, the constitutional laws - those which 
establish the organization of the state and the procedures for 
legislating - were thought supreme and the foundation of all social 
order. Thus, no ordinary law could be considered to have legal status 
if it did not conform to them. Higher law also structured conceptions 
of the judicial role: judges, it was argued, had an "inescapable," even 
"religious," duty to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws. "Ignominy 
and disgrace would be heaped upon [their] heads" - worse, the social 
order would collapse - if they failed to fulfill this duty.28 While these 
notions lost their force during the century after the Revolution, major 
25. Leon Duguit, The Law and the State, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1917). Duguit spent 
some time at the Harvard Law School during this period. 
26. Leon Duguit, Theory of Objective Law Anterior to the State, in MODERN FRENCH 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 237-48 (Arthur w. Spencer ed., 1921). 
27. See MARIO EINAUDI, THE PHYSIOCRATIC DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL CONTROL 
(1938). Einaudi leaves the French quotations in their original French; the translations here 
are therefore my own. 
28. Id. at 35-45, 71. 
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figures such as the Abbey de Sieyes29 and Benjamin Constant30 gave 
them periodic salience. Both echoed Sieyes's famous phrase -
iterated before Marshall handed down Marbury - that: "A 
constitution is a body of obligatory laws, or it is nothing,"31 and 
therefore must not be "reduced to [the status of] a cheap chapter in 
the civil code. "32 
After 1890, no major figure in French public law took issue with 
the logic of Sieyes and Marshall. Henceforth, doctrinal commentary 
on the written sources of Public Law begin with the constitution, 
rather than statute. Maurice Hauriou asserted that: 
The national Constitution, being the most direct expression of national 
sovereignty is the supreme law of the land. This superiority consists of 
two elements: 1) the Constitution delegates powers to the representative 
institutions, which the Constitution has established; 2) the Constitution is 
superior to ordinary law, a superiority which logically leads to a system in 
which provisions of ordinary laws which are contrary to the text or the 
principles of the constitution are invalid.33 
This point is made dogmatically, even by treatise writers such as Carre 
de Malberg who opposed, as a practical matter (because not in 
principle), the introduction of judicial review into France.34 
Given judges' almost fanatical worship of statute, the reverence for 
statute was viewed as the great obstacle to be overcome by le Droit. 
The enemy of the movement was Rousseau, "the father of 'Jacobin 
despotism,' and 'Caesarian dictatorship.' "35 "We must attack at its 
root the belief in the absolute power of the General Will," Hauriou 
writes, "Few false doctrines have had so evil an influence as that 
doctrine."3 6  Duguit set about to show his colleagues that the orthodox, 
"metaphysical conception" of statute, according to which legislation 
constitutes "the formulated command of [indivisible] sovereign 
power," could no longer be sustained. By "metaphysical,'' Duguit 
simply meant the traditional notion of the state as a sovereign unity, or 
"person," against which he offered his "realist" notion, of the state as 
a multi-organization entity made up of many individuals: "A statute is 
simply the expression of the individual will of the men who make it . . 
29. EMMANUEL SJEYES, Qu'EST-CE QUE LE TIERS ETAT (Droz ed., 1970) (1789). 
30. BENJAMIN CONSTANT, COURS DE POLITIQUE CONSTITUTIONNELLE (1819). 
31. PAUL BASTID, SJEYES ET SA PENSEE 598 (1 939) (quoting Sieyes). 
32. J.H. CLAPHAM, THE ABBE SJEYES: AN ESSAY IN THE POLITICS OF THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION (1912). 
33. MAURICE HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 261 (1923). 
34. See infra note 39. 
35. KENNETH H.F. DYSON, THE STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE 172-73 
(1980). 
36. MAURICE HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DU DROIT PUBLIC 235 (1910). 
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the private members of a legislative body. Beyond that we are in the 
realm of fiction."37 Gaston Jeze, the editor of the Revue du droit public 
in 1924, echoed Duguit: 
Statutes do not express the national will; in France, a law is merely the 
manifestation of the will of the individuals - deputies and senators -
who have voted for it. Deputies and senators say of course that they 
represent the national will. But this assertion can not change the reality 
of the situation. Juridically, a statute is only the manifestation of a certain 
number of individuals.38 
This "realist" notion of the statute expresses a deep mistrust and a 
scarcely veiled animosity toward parliament, or what la Doctrine calls 
"political authority." Statutes, according to Jeze, because they are 
made by politicians - "whose technical competence might be 
mediocre and whose impartiality and spirit of justice might be 
questioned" - statutes, "no longer merit . . .  the fetishism and the 
idolatry with which they have been invested." 
The hard reality was that the constitutional laws of 1875 were 
wholly inadequate as sources for the substantive limitation of 
legislative sovereignty. As skeptics like Carre de Malberg pointed out, 
they contained no reference to any body of fundamental rights or even 
to general principles of law; they "formulated no judicial rules" and 
were "vague and general" even as to procedural requirements. Worse, 
explicit provisions reinforced rather then eroded parliamentary 
sovereignty - simple legislation was all that was required to amend 
them, for example.39 The movement countered by arguing that the 
constitution contained juridically discoverable, unwritten provisions, 
as well as the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. Hauriou's 
argument on the former is representative: 
It would be an error to believe that the principle of constitutional 
supremacy only included that which is written in the Constitution; it 
includes many other things, for example . . . the principles of 
individualism [l'ordre individualiste] which are at the foundation of the 
State . . . .  These principles constitute a kind of constitutional legitimacy 
which take their place above even the written constitution.40 
37. LEON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 70 (1919). 
38. Gaston Jeze, Le contr6/e juridictionnel des lois, 41 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 402 
(1924). 
39. R. CARRE DE MALBERG, 2 CONTRIBUTION A LA THEORIE GENERALE DE L'ETAT 
545-50, 576-622 (1922). Carre de Malberg, although sympathetic to the movement's 
objectives and to judicial review in theory, was the most influential public law specialist to 
remain faithful to the traditional model. His position was that since legislative and 
constituent powers were fused in France, these debates were entirely academic. Still, he 
argued that as a matter of legal science, the French doctrine of legislative sovereignty was 
"unacceptable." Id. at 549-50 n.33. 
40. MAURICE HAURIOU, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 298 (1923). The notion that 
individual rights are the basis of higher law is echoed even by those who were not ready to 
support the introduction of judicial review. See ESMEIN, supra note 22, at 29-30. 
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As for the Declaration, Duguit argued that since this list of rights had 
been adopted before any written constitution, and had never been 
abrogated, it must be considered an immutable feature of the 
constitutional landscape. 41 For his part, Hauriou called the declaration 
a constituent part of a permanent "social constitution," "the basis of 
public law," and thus higher than even the written, "political" 
constitution. 42 
No violence is done to this doctrinal movement by describing it in 
terms the physiocrats would recognize, namely, in terms of natural 
law. 43 For its proponents, the constitution is only partially and 
imperfectly written; the solemn function of le Droit and judicial 
authority is to complete and perfect the constitution by, in essence, 
incorporating the natural law. Once the constitution is expanded in 
this way, once higher law is made the source of all legitimate 
authority, all laws, including the constitutional text, must conform to 
them, or be themselves unconstitutional. And since the development 
of the unwritten, extra- or supraconstitutional law is a domain wholly 
within the purview of le Droit, le Droit must be recognized as a 
sovereign authority in itself. 4 4  "This school does not recognize the 
sovereignty of the State, but only the sovereignty of le Droit, and this 
formula deserves approval,'' wrote Roubier. From this perspective, 
nee-natural law doctrines may be characterized as functionally 
equivalent to rule of law notions in Anglo-American legal theory. 
That is, they both attempt to rationalize the coexistence of a system of 
judicially enforced limitations on public authority on the one hand 
with a sovereign lawmaker on the other (a task made more difficult 
for the French in the absence of the legitimizing notion, inherent in 
common-law doctrines, that judges help to make the law as they 
decide cases). 
Against this onslaught, the traditional separation of powers 
doctrine crumbled and was swept away, and with it the illegitimate 
prohibition against judicial review. "Any unconstitutional law," 
Duguit asserted, "contrary to a superior principle of le Droit, inscribed 
or not . . .  written or not . . . is a law without effect, a law without 
executory force,'' and one that people, most of all judges, ought to 
41. LEON DUGUIT, TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 673 (1923). 
42. HAURIOU, supra note 40, at 297-300. 
43. PAUL ROUBIER, THEORIE GENERALE DU DRO!T 182-92 (2d ed. 1951); Frani,ois 
Geny, La Notion de Droit en France, in 1 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DE DROIT ET DE 
SOCIOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 9, 18 ( 1931). There were, of course, great differences in form and 
substance between the natural law as articulated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and that propagated by neo-natural lawyers in the first part of the twentieth century. 
Neo-natural lawyers, for example, viewed the law not as fixed and unchanging across time 
and space, but as an evolutive product of legal science and judicial activity. See CARL 
JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 181 (1963). 
44. ROUBIER, supra note 43, at 281. 
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disobey.45 Whereas opponents of judicial review had long argued that 
the review of legislation would lead to legal uncertainty and social 
chaos, Duguit and others turned the argument on its head: disorder is 
brought about by legislators who disregard and violate the "objective" 
norms discovered and developed by le Droit.46 Judicial review, on the 
other hand, has the power to reinforce or restore systemic legitimacy 
in the face of despotism. In the absence of review, legislation that · 
violates "inalienable and imprescriptible natural rights" may be 
promulgated, and its enforcement might lead, or even require, citizens 
to exercise their natural right to revolt against an unjust regime.47 
The dominant model of judicial authority for French public law 
specialists was provided by America.48 From at least 1890 until well 
after 1958, every major figure in French public law condemned the 
very idea of a special constitutional court detached from the judiciary, 
and instead praised the American system.49 They condemned "political 
review" exercised by a state organ detached from the judiciary without 
reference to what Americans would call a "case or controversy."  
Equally important, critics argued that if a special constitutional court 
was to be established, and was to operate effectively, the practice of 
constitutional review would be continuously embroiled in political and 
partisan controversy. It was therefore thought necessary that review 
be separated from the legislative function. As Hauriou wrote: 
We condemn absolutely any system of constitutional review by a political 
organ because such review must be both independent from and 
inoffensive to the government. . . .  Such review, of whatever type, which 
occurs during the law-making process, and which hinders or even delays 
a law's promulgation, risks provoking the worst conflicts, because it 
confronts parliament in the heat of that process. One of the wisest 
policies of le Droit consists in refusing to intervene . . .  until after the fires 
have calmed, and political passions are no longer engaged. Premature 
intervention would lead to conflict without end, and would compromise 
the judge himself in [partisan] battles. We must therefore wait until the 
law has been promulgated, and sometimes long afterwards, before the 
question of its constitutionality is to be raised . . . .  It's for this reason that 
we are obliged to turn toward the judge, if still taking precautions to see 
45. DUGUIT, supra note 41, at 660-68. 
46. See Duguit, supra note 25. 
47. ROUBIER, supra note 43, at 282. 
48. In 1881, A. Saint-Girons wrote in his extremely influential Essai sur la separation des 
pouvoirs: "If ever our country was to be so happy to enjoy a system of judicial authority as 
well organized as in the United States, if ever the tenacity with which revolutionary 
prejudices was lost, we would finally understand that judges are not the enemy to weaken, 
but the truest friend of public liberties." A. SAINT-GIRONS, ESSA! SUR LA SEPARATION DES 
POUVOIRS 545-61 (1881 ) . 
49. I know of no exceptions. Even the great critic of the movement, Carre de Malberg, 
called the American system of judicial review "the best expression of the principle of 
national sovereignty." See MALBERG, supra note 39, at 545-50. 
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that his role does not become political, that is, by rigorously restricting it 
to the litigation process.50 
American constitutional theory provided the movement with a 
powerful reinterpretation of the separation of powers. The classic 
texts (the law of 1790 and the constitution of 1791 quoted above), it 
was argued, were either no longer applicable to the "modern 
judiciary," or only prohibited pre-enforcement (abstract) review by 
judges. That is, judges were enjoined from "suspending the execution" 
of duly adopted laws, something quite different from refusing to apply 
them in the judicial domain.51 Judicial review, in the normal discharge 
of the judicial function, however, violates no separation of powers; 
instead, control constitutes the fulfillment of the judicial function to 
resolve legal disputes. A nineteenth-century American rationalization 
is imported in its entirety and applied to the contemporary situation in 
France. Duguit stated: 
It has long been accepted dogma that no court could accept a plea of 
unconstitutionality and refuse to apply a formal statute even where they 
considered it unconstitutional. . . .  The principle of the separation of 
powers leads to an entirely different solution. A court which refuses to 
apply a statute on the grounds of unconstitutionality does not interfere 
with the exercise of legislative powers. It does not suspend its 
application. The law remains untouched . . . .  It is simply because the 
judicial power is distinct from and independently equal to the two others 
that it cannot be forced to apply the statutes it deems unconstitutional.5 2 
Duguit and his colleagues, believing that judges could be "led" by la 
Doctrine and "the sheer force of events to this conclusion,"53 began to 
lobby judges directly. 
The movement worked to show judges that they were juridically 
required to exercise what Americans would call substantive judicial 
review; they also argued that judges had already begun doing so, but 
apparently did not yet know it.5 4 The most important line of decisions 
supporting this interpretation involved the right of public employees 
to strike, heard by the Conseil d'etat, beginning with Winkell (1909).55 
That case involved a provision of a 1905 law that required the 
government, if it were to fire certain classes of state employees, to 
notify the latter, in writing and in advance, of the reasons for dismissal. 
Mr. Winkell's contract was terminated, along with a large number of 
his postal service colleagues, after having taken part in a postal strike, 
50. HAURIOU, supra note 33, at 267-68. 
51.  Id. at 281-82. 
52. DUGUIT, supra note 37, at 87. 
53. Id. at 92. 
54. Id. at 89. 
55. WINKELL, 3 CONSEIL D'ETAT 147 (1909). 
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and he brought action on the grounds that prior notification had not 
been given. The Conseil d'etat, appealing to no source of law and 
making no other attempt to justify its decision, ruled simply that the 
law was not applicable in dismissals pursuant to strikes involving 
public employees (despite the fact that the law contained no such 
exception). 
Hauriou (whose influence was enormous, not least because he 
wrote the doctrinal notes on administrative jurisprudence published in 
the quasi-official Recueil Sirey and in the Revue du droit public for 
more than three decades) argued that, if correct, the decision to refuse 
to apply the law could make sense only if the Conseil d'etat believed 
that the law violated a higher, constitutional principle. Hauriou found 
this principle in certain provisions of the constitutional law of 
February 25, 1875. Among other things, these gave to the executive 
the power to "name civil employees" and, Hauriou inf erred, the 
responsibility to ensure "the continuity of public service." In a long 
line of subsequent cases, the Conseil d'etat appeared to adopt 
Hauriou's line of reasoning, and even his language, although it did not 
reference the constitution or the power of constitutional review. 
Hauriou, Duguit, and others then began to claim that the judges 
"without expressly admitting it, and perhaps without even admitting it 
to themselves, have opened the way to judicial review."5 6 
In the 1920s, this campaign achieved an extraordinarily high 
degree of visibility, and began to be debated publicly in the press.57 
Outsiders took notice. In 1921, Edouard Lambert's study of American 
judicial politics - The Government of Judges and the Struggle Against 
Social Legislation in the United States - appeared, and quickly 
became essential reading.58 Lambert's work radically departed from 
traditional French public law scholarship. He eschewed formalist 
exegesis of jurisprudence and abstract legal categories, focusing 
instead on the socialization and ideological orientation of judges. 
Empirically, Lambert chose to analyze a broad class of judicial 
decisions: those that had blocked whole categories of economic 
legislation (case law that Americans classify as "substantive due 
process" review). Lambert's thesis was twofold. First, by virtue of their 
social origins, educations, and recruitment, judges were always 
reactionary, to the point of being dangerous to the proper evolution of 
society. Second, judicial review, because it inevitably leads to 
56. HAURIOU, supra note 40, at 319. Six years later, Hauriou wrote: "[I]t can no longer 
be contested that the Conseil d'etat was not engaged . . .  in interpreting the constitution, and 
with great vigor . . .  based on the constitutional principle of the continuity of public service." 
HAURIOU, supra note 33, at 286; see DUGUIT, supra note 37, at 90-91. 
57. See the newspaper, LE TEMPS, Nov. 14-29, 1925. 
58. EDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LUTTE CONTRE LA 
LEGISLATION SOCIA LE AUX ETAS-UNIS (Marcel Giard & Cie eds., 1921  ). 
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judge-made constitutions, must also inevitably give effective governing 
power to courts. Lambert introduced the term gouvernement des juges 
- which refers to any situation in which judges effectively make, 
rather than merely apply the law - into French parlance. 
Lambert, who meant his book to be read as a direct response to 
"the skillful and perseverant campaign . . . to introduce into our 
constitutional life judicial review," argued that an American 
Government of Judges situation would be the likely result if the 
movement were to succeed.59 Pointing out that le Droit in France was 
dominated by conservative, individualist notions of classic liberalism 
and neo-natural law, Lambert's conclusion was unequivocal: 
The day when the French judiciary acquires the power of judicial review, 
it will discover in our Declaration of rights all of the constituent pieces of 
what I have described as due process of law, and which have provided 
the means by which the American judiciary to force the legislature to 
bow to their supremacy. The same patient and surreptitious 
play of constitutional decision-making, which permitted American 
jurisprudence . . .  to enclose the legislature in a network of constitutional 
limitations which every day becomes more dense, will probably enable 
ours to bind the French legislature as quickly and quite as tightly.60 
French political life would be permanently altered: laissez-faire 
capitalism and its attendant morality would be frozen judicially while 
society evolved away from both; working-class movements would be 
frustrated and become dangerously alienated; and political parties 
would seek to control the recruitment of judges as a necessary means 
to ensure the success of their programs. 61 
Lambert's book had an incredible impact: it destroyed whatever 
effective political support for judicial review that existed within 
parliament and weakened doctrinal consensus. For politicians, 
according to Lemasurier: "Judicial review was no longer considered to 
be only . . .  'a play thing for jurists,' nor even a means of defending 
individual liberties, but was henceforth a weapon in the hands of 
Reaction" - palatable only to the far right and to representatives of 
monopoly capital. 62 Whereas before 1921, the doctrinal community 
was all but unanimously in favor of judicial review, once dutiful 
adherents began to express their reticence, including the editor of the 
Revue du droit public, Gaston Jeze. Having been an advocate of 
judicial review since at least 1895, 63 he withdrew his support in an 
59. Id. at 4-7. 
60. Id. at 227. 
61. Id. at 220-74. 
62. JEANNE LEMASURIER, LA CONSTITUTION DE 1946 ET LE CONTROLE 
JURIDICTIONNEL DU LEGJSLATEUR 22 (R. Pinchon & R. Durand-Auzias eds., 1954). 
63. Gaston Jeze, Con/role des deliberations des assemblees de/iberantes, 2 REVUE 
GENERALE D'ADMINISTRATION, May-Aug. 1895, at 401, 411. 
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influential editorial-style article in 1924.6 4 Jeze did not hesitate to 
confirm - approvingly - that le Droit had conclusively demonstrated 
the logical necessity of judicial review, but he dismissed the 
movement's demonstrations that the courts had already begun doing it 
as acts of "pure imagination."6 5 Unfortunately, he argued, "At the 
present, French public law being what is applied presently by the 
courts . . .  the power to control the constitutionality of legislation does 
not exist"; and this would remain the case, he argued, so long as judges 
suffered from low prestige and lacked sufficient independence. 6 6  In his 
opinion, following Lambert, judicial review, far from increasing 
judicial prestige and authority, could very well have the opposite 
effect: 
Let us suppose, and the hypothesis is not an idle one, that the 
ordinary courts or even a supreme court showed itself hostile towards 
democratic, social, or fiscal reforms. Under the pretext of substantive 
judicial review, these courts would have the formidable power to block, 
judicially, reform legislation of this kind. We would then have a 
government of judges. 
And towards what result? Conflict between a democratically elected 
parliament desirous of social reform . . .  and uudicial authority] . . .  would 
lead to the obliteration of the judges, to the discredit of the courts, and a 
new diminution of the prestige and of the independence necessary to the 
judiciary . . . .  May the French courts avoid such a catastrophic course!67 
In 1936, the practical side of the debate was put to rest by the 
courts themselves. In Arrighi, the Conseil d'etat, echoing Jeze, ruled 
that: "In the present state of French public law, this ground of appeal 
[the unconstitutionality of a statute enabling an administrative act] 
may not be entered before the Conseil d'etat," a position subsequently 
adhered to by other courts. 68 The doctrinal debate did not die, even 
during Nazi occupation, but was left hanging pending the outcome of 
the drafting of a new constitution. 
B.  Rejecting Review and Rights 
With the demise of the Vichy regime, a Constituent Assembly,· 
comprised of representatives of more than two dozen political parties, 
began the task of drafting a new constitution (for the Fourth Republic, 
1946-58). The Assembly's deliberations are important for two reasons. 
64. See Jeze, supra note 38. 
65. Id. at 400-01, 408-11 .  
66. Id. at 412-13. 
67. Id. at 421-22 (footnote omitted). 
68. LEMASURIER, supra note 62, at 170 (footnote omitted). See id. at 169-72 for a 
discussion of this caselaw. 
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First, for the first time since the Revolution, national representatives 
voted on the question of whether to establish judicial review in 
France.69 In December 1945, a committee of the first Assembly 
rejected a proposal for an American-style supreme court, by a vote of 
39-2. In April 1946, elements within the Right again tried to gain 
support for a supreme court (this time to be composed of four 
politicians chosen by parliament, and four judges to be selected by the 
Conseil d'etat and the Cour de cassation, with the President of the 
Republic acting as president and ninth member). The initiative was 
not brought to a vote. Instead, the Assembly adopted, 289-259, a 
resolution repudiating, as inimical to the French .constitutional order, 
the principle of "constitutional review."70 
Second, although they failed to enshrine constitutional rights, the 
founders of the Fourth Republic managed to express their attachment 
to rights in a Preamble to the Constitution, a text that would 
ultimately transform French law. In a decision of 197171 - hailed by 
some as France's Marbury v. Madison72 - the Constitutional Council 
began to incorporate a bill of rights into the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic (1958-). It found these rights in the Preamble to the 1946 
Constitution, which is mentioned by the Preamble to the 1958 
Constitution. The Council did so despite the fact that the founders of 
the Fifth Republic, too, had firmly rejected proposals to establish or 
refer to constitutional rights in the constitution proper.73 
The very existence of the 1946 Preamble resulted from the 
founders' failure to unambiguously "constitutionalize" an updated 
version of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. On the opening 
of the first Constitutional Assembly, the three major party groupings 
agreed that the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man was out of date 
and would have to be substantially revised to be acceptable; indeed, 
the Assembly voted 429-119 against outright incorporation of the 1789 
text.7 4 The deputies then devoted fully one quarter of their rancorous, 
69. During the Third Republic, a proposal to institute judicial review was dismissed 
without a vote. One response was recorded: "It should be added that our colleague wants to 
destroy the constitution," Anna/es de la Chambre des deputes, Debats parlementaires, Jan. 28, 
1903, at 328. 
70. LEMASURIER, supra note 62, at 32. 
71 .  Decree No. 71-44, RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DU CONSEIL  CONSTITUTIONNEL, 1971,  
at 29. For an account of this decision and its consequences for legislative sovereignty, see 
STONE, supra note 14, at 66-92, and Alec Stone, Where Judicial Politics Are Legislative 
Politics, 15 W. EUR. POL. 29 (1992). 
72. George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Was it France's Marbury v. Madison?,  35 OHIO ST. L.J. 
910 (1974). 
73. See STONE, supra note 14, at 49. 
74. GORDON WRIGHT, THE RESHAPING OF FRENCH DEMOCRACY 136-58 (1948). For 
an overview of these politics, see PHILIP WILLIAMS, POLITICS IN POST-WAR FRANCE: 
PARTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC (1958). 
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often paralyzing, debates to the question of rights, exposing an almost 
"unbridgeable gulf between Marxist materialism and collectivism on 
the one hand, and Christian democracy and individualism on the 
other."75 Upon completion, the new declaration of rights became the 
first chapter of the Constitution of April 1946, subsequently rejected 
by the electorate in referendum. Had the April 1946 Constitution 
entered into force, the declaration would have become part of French 
constitutional law, and thereby binding on parliament. As the 
Rapporteur of the drafting committee, Gilbert Zaksas (Socialist), 
neatly stated, "The declaration is a true judicial text, part of the whole 
of the constitution."7 6 Raoul Calas (Communist) agreed: the "nation's 
representatives of tomorrow will be obliged to conform to it, and to 
translate its spirit into legislation."77 
Americans, however, might be surprised to learn that the 
Constituent Assembly did not mean to subjugate the authority of the 
' 
parliamentary statute to that of constitutional rights. Edouard Herriot 
summarized the situation in these terms: 
In the solemn hierarchy of texts that guarantee the liberties of the 
people, there are 3 rungs. There is, first, statute, which determines how 
principles will be applied . . . .  Below legislation, there is the constitution, 
which brings together the organic principles [organizing] the life of this 
state. And below the constitution, there is the declaration of rights and 
responsibilities, which comes into play where politics meets or, more 
precisely, should meet, morality.78 
Had the constitution of April 1946 been ratified, France would indeed 
have seen the birth of a new bill of rights, but not therefore the 
inevitable death of parliamentary sovereignty. 
For those who drafted the Constitution of October 1946, the 
judicial enforceability of rights was a dead issue. In order to save 
themselves time and perhaps another embarrassing rejection by the 
electorate, the drafting committee voted unanimously to remove the 
chapter on rights from the constitutional text, and to include a general 
statement of principles in a Preamble.79 All agreed that the Preamble 
would not be enforceable. Jacques Bardoux, who led the fight both to 
establish a bill of rights and judicial review in the constitution, 
complained that: "The Preamble does not have the force of law. Its 
prescriptions, purely verbal and platonic, bind no one, neither the 
simple citizen, nor the public authorities, nor this Assembly, which is' 
75. 0.R. TAYLOR, THE FOURTH REPUBLIC OF FRANCE: CONSTITUTION AND 
POLITICAL PARTIES 18-19 (1951). 
76. Debats, Assemblee Nationale Constituante, Mar. 7, 1946, J.O. 1946, at 607. 
77. Id. at 617. 
78. Id. at 639. 
79. An English translation of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution is found in STONE, 
supra note 14, at 257-58. 
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henceforth free to contradict [it]. . . .  "80 Most understood the 
Preamble, as another member of the Assembly put it, to be "a polite 
bow to the general rules of the polity," and certainly not "a juridical 
expression in a form which a judge could one day apply."81 I can find 
no affirmation to the contrary, even by minor figures, in the debates of 
the Second Assembly. 
In any case, the structure of the final text of the Preamble was not 
conducive to straightforward judicial application. To the general 
satisfaction of the Right, the Preamble states simply that "the French 
people solemnly reaffirm the rights and liberties consecrated by the 
Declaration of Rights of 1789 and the fundamental principles 
recognized by the laws of the Republics." These latter "principles" 
were left unenumerated, but everyone understood the phrase with 
reference to the principle of "freedom of education," a code for 
protecting the Catholic school system. As compensation for the Left 
and collectivist center, the vast bulk of the Preamble consecrates a 
long list of "political, economic, and social principles particularly 
necessary for our times," which guarantee, among others, the 
following: equality of the sexes; the rights to leisure, employment, to 
join a union, to strike, and to obtain social security, education, and 
health care; and the responsibility of the state to nationalize all 
industries that are either de facto monopolies or that have taken on 
the character of a public service. The final product therefore 
constitutes an uncomfortable compromise between radically opposed 
notions of individual and collective rights, and of the proper 
relationship between the state and society. 
With rare exception,82 doctrinal authorities (including two future 
Constitutional Council members, Georges Vedel and Marcel Waline) 
saw in the Preamble a welcome grounding for a renewal of its 
objectives. Ignoring the political context that gave it birth, most legal 
scholars energetically and overwhelmingly declared its full juridical 
status,83 and the old debates were recast, if in wholly recognizable 
80. Debats, Assemblee Nationale Constituante, Aug. 29, 1946, J.O. 1946, at 3361-62. 
81. Debats, Assemblee Nationale Constituante, Aug. 23, 1946, J.O. 1946, at 3303. 
82. See CHARLES-ALBERT COLLIARD, PRECIS DE DROIT PUBLIC 99 (Librairie Dalloz 
ed., 1950); GEORGES RIPERT, LE DECLIN DU DROIT 13, 17 (R. Pinchon & R. Durand-Auzias 
eds., 1949). Both argued that, since violations of the Preamble would incur no sanction, the 
text could not be considered law, but merely an expression of a certain political morality. 
Both nonetheless expressed displeasure with having arrived at such a conclusion. 
83. See GEORGES BURDEAU, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES 
346-48 (R. Pinchon & R. Durand-Auzias eds., 1957); MAURICE DUVERGER, MANUEL DE 
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 370-74 (5th ed. 1948); GEORGES VEDEL, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE 
DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 326-27, 552-54 (Librairie du 
Recueil Sirey ed., 1949); Fran,.ois Geny, De l'lnconstitutionnalite des Lois ou des Autres 
Actes de l'Autorite Publique et des Sanctions Qu'elle Comporte dans le Droit Nouveau de la 
Quatrieme Republique Fram;aise, 1947 JURIS-CLASSEURS PERIODIQUES: LA SEMAINE 
JURIDIQUE 580, 613; Robert Pelloux, Le Preambule de la Constitution du 27 Octobre 1946, 
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forms. Some renewed efforts to convince judges to introduce judicial 
review on their own. Duverger, for example, argued that the Preamble 
unambiguously provided judges with a written source of general 
principles with which to construct an expansive case law of 
fundamental rights.84 Most important, the 1789 Declaration could 
finally be judicially incorporated into the constitution by the judiciary; 
echoing Duguit, Duverger wrote: 
The myth of the 'sovereignty of the National Assembly,' invoked by the 
parties on the left, has made it impossible to establish effective 
constitutional review. 
However, we think that judicial review . . .  is possible because no 
express provision of the constitution forbids it . . .  and because the 
obstacles which opposed it under the 1875 regime have disappeared . . . .  
We think that judges should have the courage to declare that they will 
accept pleas based on the unconstitutionality of legislation.85 
Geny agreed, arguing that the preamble "formulates the most 
important rules of law" and constitutes "an insurmountable barrier to 
the legislature itself" whose enforcement, "in the present state of our 
political organization, can only be judicial."8 6 
Judges proved less courageous than hoped: to this day, no court 
has refused to apply a promulgated law on the basis of its 
unconstitutionality. But, if public law lost the war, it also won some 
very important battles. The movement's project to restore the primacy 
of judges over interpretation largely succeeded. The Conseil d'etat 
began to catalogue, quite explicitly, a vast array of constitutional and 
extraconstitutional principles that could be invoked in attacking 
executive acts, but not statute. These "general principles of law" 
include such discoverable notions as "individual liberty,'' "equality 
before the law," "freedom of conscience," and "non-retroactivity,'' as 
well as previously existing, if unexplained, principles like "the 
continuity of public service. "87 Related to this development, the 
Preamble, and especially the 1789 Declaration, rapidly became a 
fertile source for annulments of executive acts,88 and the enforceability 
63 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 248, 347 (1947); Jean Rivero & Georges Vedel, Les principes 
economiques et sociaux et la Constitution: Le preambule, COLLECTION DROIT SOCIAL, May 
31, 1947, at 13, 15; Marcel Waline, Notes de Juriprudence, 66 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 691, 
694 (1950). 
84. See OUVERGER, supra note 83. 
85. DUVERGER, supra note 83, at 374-78. 
86. Geny, supra note 83, at 613. 
87. See JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON & SIMON WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH 
LAW ch. 6 (1998); L. NEVILLE BROWN & J. F. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
1 19-26 (2d ed. 1973). 
88. See James Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 189, 197; 
see also LEMASURIER, supra note 62, at 187-200. 
August 2003] Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review 2765 
of the text was proclaimed in 1956 by the Conseil d'etat in A micales.89 
Finally, and most important, the Constitutional Council explicitly 
constitutionalized rights review in the 1970s, a move that we now 
know was a necessary, absolutely crucial stage in the Council's 
courtship of the Public Law establishment. By the end of that decade, 
la Doctrine had overcome its long-standing hostility to abstract 
"political review."90 
By the end of the 1980s, a new scholarly community, le Droit 
constitutionnel, had fully emerged. La Doctrine now seeks legitimation 
for review, and its own social power,91 by way of Austria, not 
America.92 
II. THE EUROPEAN MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
The modern European constitutional court is the invention of 
Hans Kelsen.93 His followers and close collaborators were present at 
the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany,9 4 and they 
successfully advocated a variant of the Austrian system as an 
89. Conseil d'etat, July 1 1 ,  1956, Recueil decisions du Conseil d'etat, 1956, at 317, note 
Jacomet. 
90. For a recounting of these events, see STONE, supra note 14, ch. 4. 
91.  The proponents of the "new constitutional law" now aggressively proclaim the 
primacy of law over politics, and of the constitutional law over all other domains of law. See 
LOUIS FA VOREU, LA POLITIQUE SAISE PAR LE DROIT (Economica 1988); Louis Favoreu, Le 
droit constitutionnel, droit de la Constitution et constitution du droit, 1 REVUE FRAN<;:AISE DE 
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 71  (1990). 
92. The canonical texts are CHARLES EISENMANN, LA JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE 
ET LA HAUTE COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE D'AUTRICHE (Librairie Generale de Droit & de 
Jurisprudence ed., 1928); and Hans Kelsen, La garantie juridictionnelle de la Constitution, 45 
REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 197 (1928). Eisenmann, a close student of Hans Kelsen, argued in 
favor of a specialized constitutional court. Until the 1970s, his work was largely ignored. 
Today it is viewed as seminal. See LA PENSEE DE CHARLES EISENMANN (Paul Amselek ed., 
Economica 1986). 
93. That said, Kelsen partly adapted institutional materials that had developed in 
various Germanic federal states of the nineteenth century. For a discussion of the origins of 
European constitutional courts, see Klaus Von Beyme, The Genesis of Constitutional Review in 
Parliamentary Systems, in CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, 2 1 -38 (Christine Landfried ed., 1989). 
94. Although I will not focus on the matter here, Germany, too, had its own turn to 
natural law, and legal scholars and judges also intensively debated judicial review. In 1863, a 
majority of the Association of German Jurists "declared itself in favor of judicial review." 
The debate provoked a new wave of constitutional theory culminating in the work of 
Kantorowicz, Fuchs, and Schmitt. For a review of these debates, see FRANZ NEUMANN, THE 
DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE ch. 2 (1964). During the Weimar Republic, 
the Reichtsgericht nullified the application of several statutes adopted by the parliament 
during the 1921-25 period. The Court asserted the power to invalidate laws on its own, 
without express constitutional authorization, at a time when political authority was too 
fragmented to effectively resist. These decisions dealt mainly with the relationship between 
property and labor; the Court sided with the former. 
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alternative to American judicial review. Italy quickly followed suit.9 5 
Kelsen's legacy was secured when constitutional reformers in Spain, 
Portugal, and post-Communist Europe all rejected American judicial 
review and adopted Kelsenian courts. I will contrast the core elements 
of the European and American "models" of review in Part III. In this 
Section, I discuss Kelsen's own blueprint for building systems of 
constitutional justice in Continental legal systems. 
A. The Kelsenian Court 
The most significant experiment in constitutional review in 
pre-World War II Europe took place during the Austrian Second 
Republic (1920-34) , at the instigation of Hans Kelsen. Kelsen 
developed the basic template for what we now call the "European 
model of constitutional review," first, in his role as the principal 
drafter of the Constitution of the Austrian Second Republic, and then 
as a legal theorist.9 6 In 1928, he wrote a widely translated article 
elaborating and defending the European model of review.97 In that 
article, Kelsen argued that the integrity of the legal system, which he 
conceived as a kind of central nervous system for the state, would only 
be assured if the superior status of the constitution, atop a 
hierarchically ordered system of legal norms, could be guaranteed by a 
"jurisdiction," or "court-like" body. Because Kelsen foresaw nearly all 
of the variations on the European model now in place, and because 
Kelsen's constitutional theory remains a standard reference for 
debates about the legitimacy of European constitutional review even 
today, it is worth examining these arguments closely. 
Kelsen faced two hostile camps: politicians suspicious of the 
judiciary and judicial power, and a pan-European movement of 
prominent legal scholars who favored installing American judicial 
review on the Continent. Kelsen understood that the political elites 
would not accept the establishment of judicial review in Europe. 
Nevertheless, he guessed that a constitutional court, if granted 
carefully prescribed powers, might not arouse their hostility. The trick 
would be to show that such a system could provide the benefits of 
constitutional review without turning into a "government of judges." 
95. In 1947-48, representatives to the Italian constitutional convention debated and 
rejected American-style judicial review. See Alessandro Pizzorsusso, V. Vigoriti, & G. Leroy 
Certoma, The Constillltional Review of Legislation in Italy, 3 CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 
311  (1984). 
96. Born in the worst of times, the Second Republic functioned properly for barely a 
decade before being engulfed by Fascism. The Court's review powers were rescinded by 
government decree in 1933. CHARLES GULICK, AUSTRIA BETWEEN HABSBURG AND 
HITLER 185-86, 877-88, 1075-77 (1948). 
. 
97. Kelsen, supra note 92. This section is based on ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING 
WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE ch. 2 (2000). 
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In his 1928 article, Kelsen engaged both fronts at once. First, he 
distinguished the work of legislators, which he characterized as 
"creative" and "positive," from the work of constitutional judges, 
which he characterized as "negative."98 Legislators make law freely, 
limited only by procedural constitutional law (which distributes 
governing authority among institutions and levels of government and 
establishes the rules of the legislative process). Kelsen acknowledged 
that the authority to declare legislation unconstitutional is also a 
lawmaking, and therefore political, authority: 
To annul a law is to assert a general [legislative] norm, because the 
annulment of a law has the same character as its elaboration - only with 
a negative sign attached . . . .  A tribunal which has the power to annul a 
law is, as a result, an organ of legislative power.99 
But if constitutional judges make law, they do not do so freely, since 
judges' decisionmaking is "absolutely determined by the constitution." 
A constitutional court is therefore only "a negative legislator."100 
Kelsen's distinction between the positive and negative legislator 
relies almost entirely on the absence, within the constitutional law, of 
a judicially enforceable charter of rights. Here we encounter another 
feature of Kelsen's thought, a conception of the law and of the proper 
role of courts that goes under the label, "legal positivism." Grossly 
simplifying, for positivists the law is that corpus of prescriptions that 
some person or group (a lawmaker) has made, which are enforceable 
by courts and other state institutions, and which are meant to apply 
authoritatively to specific situations. Kelsen's conception of the unity 
of the legal system (a hierarchical system of interdependent rules) 
rested on the fundamentally positive nature of the constitution. 
Positivism is often juxtaposed to "natural law" theories, which 
generally assert that human will, however organized in any given 
society, is neither the only, nor the ultimate source of law. Instead, 
some foundational principles of law (such as human rights) transcend 
time and place, and therefore are (or ought to be) directly applicable 
in every legal system, even when they have not been proclaimed by a 
lawmaker. In the European positivist's legal order, judges apply the 
acts of the lawmaker; in the natural law legal order, judges seek to 
"discover" and then apply · principles that exist prior to and 
independent of any sitting legislature. 
Kelsen argued that constitutions should not contain human rights, 
which he associated with natural law, due to their open-ended nature. 
Adjudicating rights claims, in his view, would inevitably weaken 
positivism's hold on judges, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the 
98. Kelsen, supra note 92. 
99. Id. at 221-41. 
100. Id. 
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judiciary itself, since judges would become the lawmakers. Thus, he 
wrote: 
Sometimes constitutions themselves may refer to [natural law] principles, 
which invoke the ideals of equity, justice, liberty, equality, morality, etc., 
without in the least defining [precisely] what are meant by these 
terms . . . .  But with respect to constitutional justice, these principles can 
play an extremely dangerous role. A court could interpret these 
constitutional provisions, which invite the legislator to honor the 
principles of justice, equity, equality . . .  as positive requirements for the 
[substantive] content of laws.101 
To the extent that constitutional judges would actually invoke natural 
law, Kelsen demonstrated, they would become positive legislators. A 
"government of judges" situation would ensue, and a political 
backlash against constitutional review would be the likely outcome. 
Second, Kelsen argued that the constitutional court should be able 
to review the constitutionality of legislation before its enforcement in 
the public realm, thus preserving the sovereign character of statute 
within the legal system thereafter. Opposition politicians, sitting in 
parliament or in subnational governments within federal systems, 
should be able to initiate such review. 
Third, Kelsen urged that constitutional courts should look as much 
as possible like "judicial" bodies. He insisted that professional judges 
and law professors be recruited to the court and emphasized that 
"members of parliament or of the government" be excluded; because 
the court would play a legislative role, he also proposed that elected 
officials should appoint the court's members. Kelsen suggested that 
the Court be given jurisdiction over constitutional controversies 
brought forward through litigation in the judiciary, as a means of 
securing the superiority of constitutional law, and so as to link the 
Court's work with formally judicial processes. Finally, individuals 
and/or a special constitutional ombudsmen might be given the 
authority to refer matters to the Constitutional Court 
Outside of Austria, Kelsen's ideas about constitutional justice were 
ignored or dismissed during the interwar period. Traditionalists, like 
the German theoretician, Carl Schmitt, argued that Kelsen's court 
would not function as a court at all, but would instead become a kind 
of superlegislature. 102 Proponents of American-style review regarded 
Kelsen's ideas as heresy, a brief for "political" rather than "judicial" 
review. Most important, across Europe the major political parties 
remained hostile to the establishment of review of any kind. 
101. Id. 
102. CARL SCHMITI, Das Reichsgericht als Huter der Verfassung in. 
VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE AUFSATZE (1958); Nicol6 Zanon, La Polemique Entre Hans 
Ke/sen et Carl Schmitt sur la Justice Consitutionne/le, 5 ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE 
JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE 177-89 (1989). 
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Legislation must respect constitutional principles, the argument went, 
but only legislators should possess the authority to assure that respect. 
Of course, the awesome destruction of World War II made 
possible the diffusion of the Kelsenian court. The experience of 
fascism in Italy and Germany before the war, and the massive 
American presence in both countries after it, conspired to fatally 
undermine the view that parliaments could do no wrong. Taming the 
state - constraining government in a system of democratic controls, 
recognizing the liberties of individuals, and embedding states in 
pan-European structures (like NATO, the Convention on Human 
Rights, and the emerging European Communities) - was suddenly at 
the very top of the European agenda. As democratic reconstruction 
proceeded, higher-law constitutionalism became the new orthodoxy, 
replacing that of legislative sovereignty and the General Will. 
The precepts of this "new constitutionalism" can be simply listed: 
(1) state institutions are established by, and derive their authority 
exclusively from, a written constitution; (2) this constitution assigns 
ultimate power to the people by way of elections; (3) the use of public 
authority, including legislative authority, is lawful only insofar as it 
conforms with the constitutional law; (4) that law will include 
constitutional rights and a system of constitutional justice to defend 
those rights. As an overarching political ideology, or theory of the 
state, the new constitutionalism faces no serious rival today. 
The European model of review proved popular because - unlike 
American judicial review - it could be easily attached to the 
parliamentary-based architecture of the state. Nevertheless, Kelsen's 
institutional blueprint had to be modified in one crucial respect. 
Kelsen had argued that constitutional courts should be denied 
jurisdiction over constitutional rights, in order to ensure that judicial 
and legislative functions remain as separate as possible. Since World 
War II, Europe has experienced a rights revolution, a hugely 
important movement to codify human rights at both the national and 
supranational levels. The burden of protecting these rights has fallen 
on modern Kelsenian courts. 
III. THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW 
Today, two basic models of constitutional judicial review exist in 
Western legal systems: the American and the European. The 
European model of constitutional review can be broken down into 
four constituent components. First, constitutional judges alone 
exercise review powers; the "ordinary" (that is, the nonconstitutional) 
judiciary may not invalidate norms or acts on grounds of 
unconstitutionality. Second, terms of jurisdiction restrict constitutional 
courts to resolving constitutional disputes. Formally, constitutional 
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judges do not preside over litigation or appeals, per se, which remain 
the purview of the judiciary. Instead, constitutional judges answer the 
constitutional questions that are referred to them by, among others, 
elected politicians and ordinary judges. Third, constitutional courts 
have links with, but are detached from, the judiciary and legislature. 
They occupy their own "constitutional" space, one that is neither 
"judicial" nor "political," as those terms are commonly understood in 
Europe. Fourth, most constitutional courts are empowered to 
determine the constitutionality of statutes without respect (or even 
prior) to their application, usually upon referral by opposition 
legislators or other elected officials. This latter mode of review, called 
"abstract review," is typically defended as a supplemental guarantor of 
constitutional justice, since it can succeed in eliminating 
unconstitutional legislation before harm has been done. Thus, in the 
European model, the judiciary enforces the supremacy of statute, 
while the constitutional court secures the supremacy of the 
constitution in relation to all other legal norms. 
If European constitutional review is concentrated, in the sense of 
being exclusively located in a specialized state organ, American 
judicial review is diffuse. In the U.S. "any judge of any court, in any 
case, at any time, at the behest of any litigating party, has the power to 
declare a law unconstitutional. "103 The power was derived by Chief 
Justice Marshall in Marbury from Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 
Article III confers on the courts jurisdiction over "cases" and 
"controversies" that "arise" under the "Constitution" and the "Laws. " 
If all American courts may enforce the constitutional law, the exercise 
of review powers remains a "judicial" matter to the extent that such 
exercise is necessary to resolve specific "cases and controversies." For 
the purposes of constitutional law and politics, a "case" is defined as 
litigation in which one of the disputing parties alleges to have been 
damaged by the enforcement of an unconstitutional law or other 
public act. 
In Europe, American judicial review is typically portrayed as being 
perfectly concrete: it is activated by a claim that the enforcement of an 
unconstitutional law caused a real person - one of the litigants -
actual injury. Abstract review of statutes and other acts appears to be 
precluded by the "cases and controversies" requirement. Likewise, 
American courts are supposed to deny standing to parties that fail to 
show some degree of direct interest in the review of a public act, 
although doctrines governing standing have been famously unclear 
and unstable. 
From an American perspective, European constitutional review 
requires the interjection of abstraction into the proceedings. In its 
103. Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet, The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, 26 
COMP. POL. STUD. 400 (1994). 
August 2003] Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review 2771 
pure form, abstract review is preenforcement constitutional review of 
legislation. It is abstract because it proceeds in the absence of 
litigation: the judge reads the legislative text against the constitutional 
law and then decides. There is no storyline or, if there is, the story is 
an imaginary or hypothetical one told to highlight the constitutional 
moral that comes at the end. What Europeans call "concrete review" 
is activated by a reference from a judge to the constitutional court. 
What makes concrete review nominally concrete is its connection to -
being a stage in - a preexisting judicial process. Concrete review is 
activated when a judge sends a question to the constitutional court. 
She is required to do so when she has good reason to think that the 
controlling statutory or administrative norm is unconstitutional. 
European concrete review, however, remains meaningfully 
abstract in an overt and formal way. Technically, the task of the 
constitutional court is to answer the constitutional question posed -
for example, is a provision of the code unconstitutional? - not to try 
or dispose of litigation. The task of the presiding/referring judge is to 
(a) determine if the facts warrant a referral, (b) properly frame the 
question to the constitutional court, and ( c) resolve the dispute in light 
of the answer given. The remaining basic type of review - the 
individual constitutional complaint - is the least abstract in the sense 
that an individual must have exhausted all other remedies before 
turning to the constitutional court. Thus, when compared to the 
Canadian, the Indian, or the U.S. supreme courts, European 
constitutional courts were designed as relatively pure oracles of the 
constitutional law. Their express function is to interpret the 
constitution and thereby to resolve disputes about the meaning of the 
constitution, rather than to preside over concrete "cases" in the 
American sense. 
We can now see that in the United States the "case or controversy 
requirement" enables judicial (concrete) review while prohibiting 
abstract review. It does so in the service of peculiarly American 
separation of powers ideas. In the European model of constitutional 
review, a different mix of peculiar ideas not only permits purely 
abstract review but insists that concrete review, too, be meaningfully 
abstract. Each model defends its own version of separation of powers 
as being necessary to preserve distinctions between the "political" and 
the "judicial" functions, as these distinctions are umierstood locally. 
And each attacks the other version as establishing a "confusion" of 
powers that ultimately entails the usurpation of the legislative (or, 
more broadly, of the "political") function. 
IV. WHY IT MAY NOT MATTER 
Traditional separation of powers doctrines in the U.S. and Europe 
are in deep crisis. They fail to model what judges actually do when 
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they exercise their powers of review; at the same time, the boundaries 
separating the "judicial" from the "political (legislative and 
executive)" function have blurred to the point of irrelevance. These 
claims are obviously too big to defend here, so I will only make two 
summary points. First, as documented elsewhere, European 
constitutional review has become more concrete as it has evolved. 104 
"Ordinary" judges now engage in a great deal of constitutional 
interpretation and review. And constitutional courts (of which the 
most obvious examples are the German and Spanish) routinely 
determine outcomes, just as any court with general appellate 
jurisdiction in the U.S. would: through reviewing the decisionmaking 
of public authorities, including judges, in light of fact contexts and 
general policy considerations. These are not surprising outcomes, 
given that European constitutional courts, in their rights-based 
jurisprudence, have evolved extensive least-means (proportionality) 
balancing standards, which they then impose on all governmental 
authorities, including parliaments and judges. Second, American 
judicial review has become increasingly abstract. In the small space I 
have remaining, I will focus briefly on this latter point. 105 
A. Abstract Review in the United States 
In the jargon of European constitutional law, "the abstract review 
of legislation" refers to the review of a statute's constitutionality prior 
to its application or enforcement. In the U.S., abstract review occurs 
most often in one of the following two situations.106 First, under certain 
circumstances, plaintiffs may seek declaratory or injunctive relief by a 
judge that, if granted, suspends the application of the law in question 
pending judicial determination of its constitutionality. Plaintiffs 
commonly file such requests immediately after the statute has been 
signed into law by the appropriate authority. Second, under doctrines 
first developed by the Supreme Court pursuant to First Amendment 
litigation, plaintiffs may attack a law on its face, called a "facial 
challenge," and plead the rights of third parties. Although there is 
often overlap between these two situations - a plaintiff mounting a 
facial challenge to a law will typically ask for preliminary relief - each 
deserves to be analyzed on its own. 
Preliminary injunctions and declaratory judgments are legal 
remedies that were first developed by courts of equity. In the past fifty 
years or so, these techniques have penetrated into the constitutional 
104. STONE SWEET, supra note 97, at ch. 4-5. 
105. See Alec Stone, Qu'y a-t-il de concret dans le controle abstrait aux Etats-Unis?, 34 
REVUE FRAN<;:AISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 227 (1998). 
106. Federal courts also continuously exercise the abstract (preenforcement) review of 
the rulemaking of federal agencies. 
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law, becoming instruments of rights adjudication. Preliminary 
injunctions are court orders taken to preserve the status quo ante !item 
pending a judicial resolution of the dispute on the merits. Declaratory 
judgments are used by judges to clarify the rights of one of the parties 
to a dispute, prior to that dispute's resolution. When exercising 
judicial review, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, 
commonly treat these forms of relief interchangeably. From the point 
of view of the plaintiff, moreover, there appears to be little difference 
in their relative effectiveness. The criteria that govern the granting of 
preliminary injunctions also apply to the rendering of declaratory 
judgments. Judges will give relief where a plaintiff's constitutional 
rights are at issue, where the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits, 
and where the plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury if relief is not 
granted.107 
All students of American constitutional law know that the 
American Supreme Court has held, since Thornhill v. Alabama,108 that 
a statute that extends government authority to activities protected by 
the First Amendment is presumptively overbroad, and therefore 
unconstitutional on its face, regardless of whether, or how, the statute 
has been applied in concrete situations. Put differently, the Court 
views the normal methods of constitutional adjudication - which 
allegedly proceeds on a case-by-case basis and enables the judicial 
branch to correct the law over time, with reference to problems raised 
as a result of the law's application - to be inappropriate for 
adjudicating violations of the First Amendment.109 Indeed, the Court 
treats the right of free expression as a "preferred freedom" since it 
underpins American democracy and the effective exercise of all other 
constitutional rights. In this area of the law, restrictive doctrines on 
standing and justiciability have therefore been relaxed. It is clear that 
the Court has been anxious to use its powers to protect the rights of 
individuals and groups who would normally not come before a court, 
in so far as they may refrain from exercising their rights for fear of 
punishment under a restrictive law. 
Thus, in its present form, the doctrine of "overbreadth" carves out 
an exception to the general rule, a corollary of the case or controversy 
requirement, that an individual cannot plead rights of other 
individuals not party to the action. In fact, a court that rules that a 
107. The rules are adapted from equity rules. In 1980, a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
described "the traditional equitable criteria for granting preliminary injunctive relief' as 
fourfold: "(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable 
injury to plaintiff if the preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring 
the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases)." L.A. Memorial 
Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'! Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980). 
108. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
109. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1023-24 (2d ed. 1988). 
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statute is overbroad may annul it and reverse the conviction of the 
defendant in the case, without having to determine first whether the 
expressive conduct of the defendant falls under the protection of the . 
First Amendment. In Spokane A rcades, the Supreme Court 
summarized its approach to the problem of facial overbreadth and the 
rights of third parties in the following terms: 
[A]n individual whose own speech or expressive conduct may validly be 
prohibited or sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on its face 
because it also threatens others not before the court - those who desire 
to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing 
so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared 
partially invalid. If the overbreadth is "substantial," the law may not be 
enforced against anyone, including the party before the court, until it is 
narrowed to reach only unprotected activity, whether by legislative 
action or by judicial construction of partial invalidation. 1 10  
Courts resolve facial challenges in different ways. A court may 
render a decision that reduces the reach of a statute, without declaring 
its provisions unconstitutional. In such cases, the Court effectively 
interprets the statute in a particular way in order to make it 
constitutional. This "saving construction" binds the judiciary. A court 
may also invalidate the statute as unconstitutional "on its face." A 
facial challenge will be successful if a court (1) agrees with the plaintiff 
that the law sweeps within its ambit activities protected by the First 
Amendment, thereby deterring these activities in a "substantial" and 
"socially significant" way, and (2) is unable or unwilling to construct a 
more narrow interpretation of the provisions being attacked, or to 
"sever" potential constitutional applications of the law from 
unconstitutional applications. Of course, even if the appeal fails to 
result in a total invalidation of the law, a partial invalidation - an 
exercise in "reconstructive surgery" - may be exactly the outcome 
the plaintiff wanted. To successfully defend a law, the government 
must demonstrate two things. First, it must show that whatever 
"chilling effect" on speech the regulation might provoke will not be 
substantial but rather improbable and socially insignificant. Second, it 
must prove that the statute could not have been drafted more 
narrowly, that is, that there was no "less restrictive alternative" 
statutory language available. A less restrictive alternative provision is 
one that is more likely to exclude unconstitutional applications and to 
reduce the deterrent effects of the regulation. 
Most invalidations pursuant to judicial findings of overbreadth are 
partial invalidations: the court removes provisions that, in its view, 
would lead to unconstitutional applications of the law, allowing what 
remains of the law to be applied. However, "severing" unconsti-
110. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985) (footnote omitted) 
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)). 
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tutional provisions from an otherwise constitutional statute is not 
always possible. If the offending provisions are central to the statute, 
the benefits of severability are absent. In such cases, the court has 
little choice but to invalidate the entire statute, and no part of it will be 
enforceable. 1 1 1  
Although plaintiffs who mount a facial challenge for overbreadth 
may claim that the same statute is also unconstitutionally vague, 
overbreadth and vagueness are distinguishable.112 A statute is vague, 
and therefore unconstitutional, if persons "of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meanings and differ as to its 
application. "113 A vague statute suffers from two interrelated flaws. 
First, it entails a high risk of discriminatory enforcement, raising 
concerns about due process and equal protection of the laws. Second, 
the risk of discriminatory enforcement may itself substantially deter or 
"chill" the exercise of rights. To successfully defend a law attacked for 
vagueness, the government must show that the deterrent effect of the 
statute would not be substantial and that a more precise construction 
of its provisions, given the government's purposes, was not possible. 
Of course, the abstract review of statutes conflicts with orthodox 
understandings of judicial authority in the U.S. The role of the 
judiciary, states the Constitution, is to resolve cases and controversies. 
The precise, juridical meaning of the phrase "case and controversy" 
has never been fixed, however, which means the courts decide as they 
see fit. In practice, the phrase references doctrines related to 
separation of powers, standing to sue, and justiciability. Each of these 
legal frameworks has been constructed in complex lines of case law 
which are by now more or less incoherent, and therefore subject to the 
whims of the judges. In what is arguably the most authoritative 
statement on the problem by the Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Warren acknowledged this "uncertainty": 
Embodied in the words "cases" and "controversies" are two 
complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words 
limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary 
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution 
through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role 
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that 
the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other 
branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give 
expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case 
and controversy doctrine. 
1 1 1. See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 
( 1980);Connally v. Gen. Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). 
1 12. See TRIBE, supra note 109, at 1033-35. 
1 13. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. 
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Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope . . . .  
[N)o justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek 
adjudication of only a political question, when the parties are asking for 
an advisory opinion, when the question sought to be adjudicated has 
been mooted by subsequent developments, and when there is no 
standing to maintain the action. Yet it remains true that "justiciability is 
not a legal concept with a fixed content of susceptible or scientific 
verification. Its utilization is the resultant of subtle pressures . . . .  " 
Additional uncertainty exists in the doctrine of justiciability because 
that doctrine has become a blend of constitutional requirements and 
policy considerations. And a policy limitation is "not always clearly 
distinguished from the constitutional limitation." . . .  The "many subtle 
pressures" which cause policy considerations to blend into the 
constitutional limitation of Article III make the justiciability doctrine 
one of uncertain and shifting contours. 1 14 
No treatise on American constitutional law uses the term "abstract 
review." American constitutional practice and scholarship are largely 
ignorant of European constitutional law, where abstract review is 
ubiquitous. Confronted with a statement to the effect that American 
judges do indeed exercise abstract judicial review, an American judge 
or constitutional scholar would typically respond in one of two very 
different ways. First, the statement might be denied outright. Any law 
which substantially deters the exercise of some fundamental, 
constitutional right - such as the freedom of speech, or the right to 
privacy - creates, by its very existence, a "case or controversy" 
between those individuals so deterred and the government that deters 
them. This is the logic that underpins doctrines governing facial 
challenges and the granting of preliminary relief. Second, in contrast 
to the first response, the statement might be recast in terms that make 
sense to American judges and lawyers. It could be acknowledged that 
the practices described do indeed fall outside the case or controversy 
requirement but are relatively limited exceptions to the normal rules 
or are pathologies of American case law. Thus, a leading textbook 
states that preliminary relief "takes a form suspiciously like that of an 
advisory opinion,"1 1 5 which is prohibited. And Justice Black, in his 
opinion for the majority in Younger, 1 1 6  complained that "facial 
challenges are fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal 
courts" to resolve cases and controversies. 
1 14. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
115 .  WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 122 (9th ed. 
1993). 
1 16. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971). 
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However understood, the abstract review of statutes flourishes in 
the United States. Indeed, abstract review has become the "normal," 
taken-for-granted mode of adjudicating in the domains of free 
speechm and reproductive rights.1 1 8  All-important statutes that would 
restrict free speech or the right to choose to terminate pregnancies are 
routinely attacked on their face and are candidates for preliminary 
relief. In such cases, what do American judges do? They make 
authoritative guesses about the future: guesses about how people 
would likely behave under the law; guesses about how a law would 
likely be enforced by public officials; guesses about how a statutory 
provision would likely be construed by the courts; and guesses about 
how many citizens would likely be hurt if the court permitted the law 
to be applied. European constitutional courts, when they exercise 
abstract review, make such determinations all of the time, informed, 
just as American judges are, by legislative histories and debates, and 
by their knowledge of how similar laws have been enforced and 
judicially interpreted in the past. Unlike the American courts, 
however, European constitutional judges do not have to perform 
doctrinal gymnastics to justify their abstract review powers. 
The specific techniques of abstract review developed by American 
judges are strikingly similar to those developed by European judges. I 
will mention three of the most important of these here. First, abstract 
review in both places always proceeds through the elaborate 
construction of balancing tests. Inevitably, such tests organize the 
judicial considerations of hypothetical situations, narratives with 
abstractions as characters, stand-ins for real people facing challenging 
dilemmas. There is nothing concrete in such review, except in so far as 
the decision reconfigures the constitutional environment for the 
legislature, for the future. If and when the legislators do so, they will 
have to imagine the situation at least partly as the judges have. 
Second, once American judges have concluded that specific statutory 
provisions are unconstitutional, they then proceed to determine if 
these provisions can be severed from the statute to enable the 
constitutional, and thus uncontaminated, parts to be applied. What is 
perhaps the leading constitutional law textbook in the United States 
characterizes this practice as "surgery," or pruning the rotten branches 
1 17. In 1996, in an attempt to regulate pornography on the internet, the U.S. Congress 
adopted the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"). Knowing that the 
constitutionality of the CDA would be litigated before the Act would be enforced, 
legislators included a special provision, § 561, designed to expedite the review of the law's 
constitutionality in the event of a facial challenge. The law was immediately attacked by 
some twenty interest groups, and the provisions attacked were voided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court as unconstitutional before they had been enforced against anyone. See Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
1 18. State supreme courts, too, exercise abstract constitutional review of statutes. See, 
e.g. , Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997) (concerning parental 
consent to abortion in the case of minors). 
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from the tree. 1 19 European constitutional judges employ the same 
techniques, and judges and scholars use virtually the same language to 
describe the process. The French Council, for example, performs 
"amputations" on provisions "contaminated" by unconstitutionality, 
allowing what remains to be promulgated. Third, American judges and 
European constitutional courts routinely participate in the legislative 
function by using their review powers to give authoritative 
interpretations of statutes - the "saving construction" in American 
parlance and "strict reserves of interpretation" in France; other 
phrases are used to describe the same things in Germany, Italy, and 
Spain. The judges do so in order (1) to permit the law to enter into 
force, and thus soften the impact of constitutional review on the 
legislature, and (2) to control how the law will be enforced by public 
authorities and applied by the judiciary in the future. These 
similarities deserve to be studied more closely by comparative 
constitutional scholars. 
More generally, rights review of legislation, as Kelsen predicted, 
makes of the judge a "positive" legislator. Clearly, the more judges are 
asked to protect rights in an effective manner - the pan-European 
situation - or the more judges consider effective rights protection to 
be their constitutional duty - the American situation - the less likely 
constitutional review will conform to, or be contained by, separation 
of powers doctrines that work to separate things judicial from things 
political. Put very differently, in systems in which the supremacy of the 
constitutional law within the general hierarchy of norms is defended 
by a jurisdictional authority, all separation of powers notions are 
contingent because they are secondary to, rather than constitutive of, 
the judicial function. 
If I have emphasized the relatively formal, doctrinal construction 
of abstract review in the U.S., there is a far more profound sense in 
which all exercises in judicial review must always be more abstract 
than concrete. The power of judicial review is the power to determine 
constitutional policy, prospectively. American judges routinely engage 
in prospective lawmaking, and therefore in abstract reasoning and 
decisionmaking. 120 
V. CONCLUSION 
One issue - the political legitimacy of American judicial review -
dominates this Symposium on Marbury v. Madison. In sharp contrast 
with the European situation, Americans - or at least the legal 
1 19. TRIBE, supra note 109, at 1027-33. 
120. The argument is made at greater length and detail in Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone 
Sweet, Abstract and Concrete Review in the United States, in MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC 
STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION ch. 6 (2002). 
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academy - remain deeply divided over the question of if and how to 
defend constitutional review. 
Most contemporary arguments about the legitimacy of review fall 
into one of two broad types. The first type of argument proceeds from 
some theory of delegation, that is, from the source and consequences 
of enumerated powers. The salient questions are those fetishized by 
American lawyers. Does the constitution (or do the People) authorize 
review, and under what conditions? How should review powers "fit" 
with constitutional structure and separation of powers doctrines? Can 
the lawmaking of the "judicial" branch of government be 
distinguished from the lawmaking of the "political" branches? The 
second type of argument proceeds from a theory, or clash of theories, 
about constitutional justice. Europeans, who equate constitutional 
justice with rights jurisprudence, tend to focus on different questions. 
To what extent do rights provisions possess a transcendental, or 
supraconstitutional, juridical status? Do rights necessarily permeate 
every domain of law, public and private? Does the structure of rights 
provisions, alone and with respect to rest of the constitution, favor 
certain forms of interpretation, and certain kinds of balancing 
techniques? The orientation seems a natural one, since the very 
structure of European rights provisions appears to require the 
development of proportionality balancing standards. 
As this Symposium shows, American constitutional theory is stuck 
in the first type of argument. Americans grapple with, but never finally 
resolve, the "countermajoritarian" problem - or, what is to be done 
about judicial supremacy? The theorist may famously demonstrate 
that the courts comprise the "least dangerous branch,"121 at least in 
some areas of politics, under certain conditions,122 or he may oppose 
such claims.123 Ultimately, judges are free to determine for themselves 
how intrusive their review of government shall be at any given point in 
time, and it is this discretion that causes so much hand-wringing. New 
European constitutions expressly provide for review and for the 
supremacy of constitutional courts with respect to constitutional 
interpretation. European academics and constitutional judges will 
state as much in one breath, and then move on to more interesting 
issues. For most practical purposes, the formal legitimacy of review is 
simply a non-issue. Elected politicians, for their part, have periodically 
accused constitutional courts of imposing a "government of judges," 
but such complaints are increasingly muted, when heard at all. At the 
121. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
122. See, e.g. , PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1982); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
123. See, for example, some of the contributions to this Symposium. 
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same time, European constitutional courts have steadily consolidated 
their positions as powerful policymakers: in just the past three 
decades, the French, German, and Italian courts have, respectively, 
invalidated more national laws than has the U.S. Supreme Court - in 
its entire history. 
A century ago, American constitutional theory was avant-garde, a 
liberating and invigorating force in Europe. Today by comparison, 
American discourse on review appears infirm, defensive, embarrassed 
of what cannot be hidden away. Even Marshall's supporters seem to 
treat Marbury as if it were the original sin of American consti­
tutionalism, the source of timeless tensions inherent and irresolvable. 
